Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism. by Rutherglen, George
RECONSTRUCTING ERIE: A COMMENT ON 
THE PERILS OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 
George Rutherg/en* 
The opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins overruled Swift 
v. Tyson in a single definitive sentence: "There is no federal general 
common law."I As we subsequently learned, however, "Erie did 
not merely overrule a venerable case" but "a particular way oflook-
ing at law which dominated the judicial process long after its inade-
quacies had been laid bare. "2 That older way of looking at law took 
it to be a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," independent of the 
actions of public institutions and officials.J Erie rejected this view-
a form of natural law-in favor of legal positivism, the contrary 
view that all forms of law are derived from the actions of govern-
ment. This comment discusses the jurisprudential foundations of 
Erie. Part I places the positivist argument in Erie in the context of 
the other, more conventional legal arguments in the opinion. Part 
II examines the dominant modern conceptions of legal positivism 
and how they apply to the decision in Erie. And Part III examines 
the consequences of legal positivism, especially for the new federal 
common law that has grown up after Erie. 
I. THE ARGUMENTS OF ERIE 
In his opinion in Erie, Justice Brandeis offered several conven-
tional legal arguments for denying the existence of federal general 
common law. These are arguments based on the legislative history 
of the Rules of Decision Act; on the inconsistency between federal 
• John Allan Love and John V. Ray Research Professor, University of Virginia. I 
would like to thank Earl Dudley, John Han Ely, John Jeffries, Pam Karlan, Hal Krent, Peter 
Low, John McCoid, Paul Mishkin, Dan Oniz, Larry Walker, Steve Walt and Ted White for 
commenting on earlier drafts of this anicle. 
I. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
2. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). 
3. The phrase, of course, is from Holmes. When he first used it, in a dissent, he ac· 
knowledged the possibility that it was a minority view. "The common law is not a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky but the aniculate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can 
be identified; although some decisions with which I have disagreed seem to me to have forgot-
ten the fact." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). Legal positivism has since become the working legal theory of most judges and lawyers. 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 16 (Harv. U. Press, 1978). 
285 
286 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:285 
general common law and state common law; and on the unconstitu-
tionality of Swift v. Tyson. With the passage of time, each of these 
arguments has come under attack and each has been abandoned, 
revised or reinterpreted. The argument based on legal positivism, 
although it plays a crucial role in the last and most important of 
these arguments, has yet to be reassessed in light of subsequent de-
velopments. A brief review of the conventional legal arguments in 
the opinion will put the jurisprudential argument in perspective. 
Justice Brandeis began his opinion by relying upon then-recent 
research into the history of the Rules of Decision Act. 4 Professor 
Charles Warren, he claimed, had demonstrated that the First Con-
gress intended state common law, in addition to state statutory law, 
to be included within "the laws of the several states" that were 
binding on the federal courts.s The legislative history, however, is 
at least ambiguous; and as Professor Wilfred Ritz has more recently 
argued, it demonstrates instead that the act was intended to serve as 
a stopgap measure until a body of federal legislation could be en-
acted.6 To the extent that Congress considered the meaning of the 
phrase "the laws of the several states," it probably meant to refer to 
the laws of the states collectively. At the time, the law of any one 
state, much like federal law, was too undeveloped to provide much 
guidance to federal judges. 1 
Justice Brandeis's next argument has fared better, although it 
has always been of limited force. He argued that the inconsistencies 
between the federal general common law applied by the federal 
courts and the state common law applied by the state courts "ren-
dered impossible equal protection of the laws. "s By this phrase, of 
course, he did not mean a denial of equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, because Swift v. Tyson was federal law, 
and, at the time, the Fifth Amendment was not interpreted to have 
an equal protection component. 9 What he meant was inequitable 
4. 304 U.S. at 72-73. 
5. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 
Harv. L. Rev. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923). 
6. The anticipated federal legislation was a federal criminal code. The essential pur-
pose of the Rules of Decision Act therefore foundered on the refusal of the Supreme Court to 
recognize a common law of crimes. Wilfred J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789: Exposing Myths. Challenging Premises, and Using New Evidence 131-34, 140-48 (U. 
of Okla. Press, 1990). 
7. Id. at 44-52, 83-87, 140-41. 
8. 304 U.S. at 73-78. 
9. Only later was the Equal Protection Clause effectively incorporated into the Fifth 
Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). For instance, in United States v. 
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), which was decided the same day as Erie, the Court 
routinely denied an equal protection claim against the federal government. ld. at 151. 
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administration of the laws resulting from forum shopping.1o This 
argument has since had to accommodate the need for distinctive 
rules of federal procedure.u More fundamentally, the disparity in-
troduced by Swift v. Tyson could be eliminated equally well by a 
further assertion-rather than a disclaimer-of federal power. Fed-
eral common law could be made binding on the state courts, in the 
same manner that federal statutory law is binding upon them under 
the Supremacy Clause.12 
This leaves the only argument that Justice Brandeis found suf-
ficient to overrule Swift v. Tyson: that it was an unconstitutional 
assumption of powers by the federal courts.J3 The major premise of 
this argument was that the federal government is one of limited 
powers. The minor premise was that the Constitution conferred the 
lawmaking power of the federal government mainly on Congress. It 
followed that the federal courts had no power to make general com-
mon law that exceeded the lawmaking powers of Congress. Yet the 
general federal common law extended to areas beyond the powers of 
Congress. 
At the time, this argument had the rhetorical force of a reduc-
tio ad absurdum. Of course the power of the federal courts to make 
law could not exceed the power of Congress (at least if we put con-
stitutional decisions to one side). The significance of this observa-
tion, however, has been eroded in the years since Erie was decided. 
The subsequent expansion of congressional power now allows Con-
gress to reach most, if not quite all, of the area formerly covered by 
the federal general common law. On the facts of Erie itself, as many 
10. John C. McCoid, II, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 Va. L. 
Rev. 884, 888-90 (1965). 
11. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); McCoid, 51 Va. L. Rev. at 887-901 (cited in 
note 10) (Hanna greatly restricts the policy of uniformity underlying the Erie doctrine). 
12. U.S. Const. art. VI. The new federal common law, of course, is binding on the state 
courts. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962). 
13. 304 U.S. at 78-80. He also alluded to this argument earlier in the opinion. "The 
federal courts assumed, in the broad field of 'general law,' the power to declare rules of deci-
sion which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes." ld. at 72. 
This was not, of course, the view that animated the opinion in Swift v. Tyson. Justice 
Story did not view a decision under the general common law as one that required a court to 
lay down a positive rule of law. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I, 18-19 (1842). Expanding upon this 
principle, the Supreme Court, in its decisions following Swift v. Tyson, increasingly disre-
garded state decisions even on issues of local law on which they were supposed to be binding. 
Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v Louisiana, 
57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1260, 1265-70 (1990). 
Even if Story had found judicial decisions to be sources of positive Jaw, a strand of legal 
thought at the time of Swift v. Tyson allowed an inference in the opposite direction from that 
taken in Erie: from the lawmaking powers of the federal courts to equivalent lawmaking 
powers of Congress. G. Edward White, History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Volumes III-IV: The Marshall Court and Cultural Change 1815-35 528-40, 562-75 (Macmil-
lan, 1988). 
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have pointed out,I4 Congress plainly has the power to establish the 
rule of liability governing accidents to those walking alongside an 
interstate railroad. At the time Erie was decided, however, this 
proposition was not quite the foregone conclusion that it is today. Is 
Brandeis could not simply assume that Congress had power under 
the Commerce Clause to replace the rule of federal general common 
law. Instead he avoided this constitutional question by making a 
more abstract argument: that federal general common law as a 
whole was illegitimate because it exceeded the power of Congress, 
not necessarily on the special facts of the case before the Court, but 
in a broad range of other cases. Today, precisely the reverse would 
be true. Most of federal general common law would be well within 
the power of Congress.16 
For this reason, the constitutional argument of Erie has since 
been reinterpreted to emphasize the distinction-at least implicit in 
the opinion-between the power of Congress and the power of the 
federal courts. The power of Congress is checked by the role of the 
states within Congress itself, and particularly by the many hurdles 
that the Constitution places in the way of lawmaking under Article 
I. The states, through their senators and representatives, have am-
ple opportunity to block federal legislation that would displace state 
law.n No corresponding check operates against the creation of fed-
eral general common law. Any major extension of federal power 
must find its source in the Constitution or in a federal statute, not in 
the common law decisions of federal judges alone. 
This argument is the best current account of Erie as a funda-
mental principle of federalism. Is In this comment, I do not propose 
to defend the continued vitality of the Erie doctrine. Despite-and 
perhaps because of-its shift in rationale, it has remained a funda-
mental principle of federalism as we know it today. The "rather 
large lake" of ink that Judge Friendly found to have been spilled on 
this subject nearly thirty years ago has now swelled to a small 
ocean.I9 Instead of adding to its volume, I would like to concen-
14. E.g., McCoid, 51 Va. L. Rev. at 887-88 n.J6 (cited in note 10). 
15. Erie was decided after NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937), 
but before Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill ( 1942). 
16. If, indeed, there are any significant limits on the power of Congress at all. See 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
17. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Col urn. L. Rev. 543, 546-52, 
558-60 (1954). 
18. Its essentials are set forth in John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 
Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1974), and Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie.--The 
Thread, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1682 (1974). 
19. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie.--And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
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trate on a single passage in the Erie opinion, one which invokes 
legal positivism to support the limited power of the federal courts to 
make common law. This passage is worth quoting in its entirety. 
The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is 
made clear by Mr. Justice Holmes. The doctrine rests upon the 
assumption that there is "a transcendental body of law outside of 
any particular state but obligatory within it unless and until 
changed by statute," that federal courts have the power to use 
their judgment as to what the rules of common law are; and that 
in the federal courts "the parties are entitled to an independent 
judgment on matters of general law": 
"But law in the sense in which courts speak of it 
today does not exist without some definite authority be-
hind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a 
state, whether called common law or not, is not the 
common law generally but the law of that state existing 
by the authority of that state without regard to what it 
may have been in England or anywhere else .... 
"The authority and only authority is the state, and 
if that be so, the voice adopted by the state as its own 
[whether it be of its legislature or of its Supreme Court] 
should utter the last word." 
Thus the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes 
said, "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the 
United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opin-
ion should make us hesitate to correct. "2o 
What is remarkable about this passage is that the last sentence, 
which argues for overruling Swift v. Tyson, contrasts so dramati-
cally-indeed nearly contradicts-all that went before. If "law 
does not exist without some definite authority behind it," in particu-
lar, without the authority of pre-existing judicial decisions, where 
does the Supreme Court itself obtain the authority to overrule its 
own pre-existing decision in Swift v. Tyson? The Court's deference 
to state judicial decisions as the only sources of common law con-
trasts dramatically with its treatment of Swift v. Tyson, not to men-
tion the many cases that had followed it, as a source of federal law. 
If Justice Holmes had discredited natural law, where does legal pos-
itivism leave room for the Erie decision itself? 
The short answer is that the Constitution required the result in 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964), reprinted in H.J. Friendly, Benchmarks 155, !56 (U. of Chi. 
Press, 1967). 
20. 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (footnote omit-
ted) (brackets in original)). 
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Erie. I do not, of course, disagree with this conclusion, but I do 
deny that it is one that a legal positivist can reach by relying exclu-
sively upon pre-existing sources of law. 
II. CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 
According to the leading proponents of legal positivism today, 
H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz, judges must resort to arguments 
based on sources outside of law to resolve cases not covered by the 
existing legal rules.21 According to Hart and Raz, when pre-ex-
isting sources of law, such as statutes, constitutions or precedent, do 
not yield a single right answer, judges must resort to arguments 
based on considerations of public policy, morality or practical poli-
tics. Hart and Raz regard these sources of argument to be outside 
of law because their authority cannot be traced back to the action of 
any recognized public official. With respect to arguments based on 
morality in particular, they claim that a sharp separation from ar-
guments based on legal sources is necessary to preserve the separa-
tion of law from morality.22 According to the familiar positivist 
slogan, a law may be immoral and still be law. 
Contemporary legal positivists, like Hart and Raz, are more 
sympathetic to the common law than the nineteenth century legal 
positivists on whom Holmes, and through him Brandeis, relied. In-
deed, it is hard to imagine that anyone could be less sympathetic to 
the common law than Jeremy Bentham, the founder oflegal positiv-
ism.23 His contempt for the common law was not shared by his 
follower, John Austin,24 but it was the positivist equivalence of 
judge and legislator which led Americans, like Holmes,2s to ques-
tion the legitimacy of judge-made law. Although this was only one 
21. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 131-32 (Clarendon Press, 1961); Joseph Raz, The 
Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 47-50, 194-201 (Clarendon Press, 1979). 
22. Hart, The Concept of Law at 181-207 (cited in note 21); Raz, The Authority of Law: 
Essays on Law and Morality at 37-38 (cited in note 21). Other theorists, even those who 
reject legal positivism, have also emphasized that nothing in the concept of law requires it to 
incorporate moral norms. E.g., Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law 4-1 (Cam-
bridge U. Press, 1988); cf. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 326-27 (cited in note 3) (re-
jecting legal positivism but accepting the distinction between law and morality). 
23. Jeremy Bentham, V Collected Works 442 (John Bowring, ed., Russell & Russell, 
1962) ("that most all-comprehensive, most grinding, and most crying of all grievances-the 
tyranny of judge-made law"); id. at 235 (judges make common law "as a man makes laws for 
his dog"). 
24. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 191 (Noonday Press, 1954). 
25. Morton J. Horwitz, The Place of Justice Holmes in American Legal Thought, in 
Robert W. Gordon, ed., The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes. Jr. 31, 39-46, 68 (Stanford U. 
Press, 1992); see H.L. Pohlman, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Utilitarian Jurisprudence 
88-105 (Harv. U. Press, 1984) (Holmes followed Austin in requiring judicial deference to 
general opinion). 
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of several contradictory strands in Holmes's thought,26 it was the 
strand that Brandeis seized upon in Erie. If judges in hard cases 
legislated by reference to sources outside the law, where did they 
gain the authority to do so? 
Justice Brandeis did not answer this question in Erie, despite 
the fact that he faced a hard case that required him to go beyond 
existing sources of law. Although the limited delegation of powers 
to the federal government, explicitly recognized in the Tenth 
Amendment, faced one way, the decision in Swift v. Tyson, and all 
that had been based upon it,27 faced the other. It was necessary for 
Justice Brandeis to appeal to principles of federalism whose source 
and weight could not be identified simply by tracing them back to 
the Constitution.zs The appeal to these principles was no less an 
assumption of power, although one that we find far more justifiable 
today, than was the federal general common law that was con-
demned in Erie. Having made this appeal outside of recognized 
legal sources, Brandeis could not criticize the federal general com-
mon law of Swift v. Tyson for lacking such a source. 
Perhaps, however, Justice Brandeis took a different view of 
legal positivism from that of Hart or Raz, one that limited the law 
to the prior decisions of public officials with effective political 
power, but that did not leave judges free to rely upon sources 
outside the law. On this view, the quoted passage only asserts that 
judicial decisions must be backed by the power of the state in order 
to be sources of law.z9 General common law violates this require-
ment because it is based on the law of no particular sovereign. 
Brandeis departed from Swift v. Tyson, then, in insisting that the 
general common law recognized in the federal courts must be fed-
26. G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self ch. II 
(Oxford U. Press, forthcoming September 1993) (Holmes dissented from cases following 
Swift v. Tyson, but also used the power to make federal general common law to lay down 
rules of tort law inconsistent with state law); see Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Prag-
matism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 787, 836-50 (1989) (summarizing the contradictory perspectives 
that Holmes took upon the law as a scholar and a judge). 
27. This history included precedent that went well beyond Swift v. Tyson. It also in-
cluded reenactment of the Rules of Decision Act in reliance upon Swift v. Tyson. Friendly, In 
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law in Benchmarks at 162-63 (cited in note 
19). 
28. See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. 
Rev. 621 (1987). 
29. This claim can be derived from Austin's version of positivism, which defined law as 
commands of the sovereign, or as orders backed by threats. Austin, The Province of Jurispru-
dence Determined at 13-26 (cited in note 24); Hart, The Concept of Law at 18-25 (cited in 
note 21). For the influence of Austin on Holmes, see Horwitz, The Place of Justice Holmes in 
American Legal Thought at 67-68 (cited in note 25); Grey, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 829 (cited ir. 
note 26). 
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erallaw.Jo And once this step was taken, it was necessary to find 
some source for the federal general common law in the Constitu-
tion. Because Brandeis could find no such source, he concluded 
that there was "no federal general common law."Jt 
Brandeis had to do more in Erie, however, than accept a trun-
cated version of legal positivism that denied judges discretion to 
tum to sources outside of pre-existing law. It was not enough for 
him to discredit the characterization of general common law in 
Swift v. Tyson on positivist principles. As he recognized, he also 
had to discredit Swift v. Tyson itself as a source of law.32 A trun-
cated version of positivism would not allow him to do that. If he 
found all judicial decisions backed by state power to be law, he 
would have had to recognize that the federal general common law 
was backed by political power-not of the states, but of the federal 
government-so that it, too, was a source of law. He could dis-
credit this source oflaw, as he did in Erie itself, with a later decision 
backed by federal power, but he could not justify this decision sim-
ply by pointing to its undeniable effects. 
Any attempt to justify the decision in Erie on positivist princi-
ples thus generates the paradox that these principles themselves 
lacked the pedigree that they required of other sources of law. 
What Brandeis needed to justify his decision was a hierarchy of 
legal arguments, so that the argument from the limited powers of 
the federal government gained priority over the precedential effect 
of Swift v. Tyson. No legal source announced this rule of priority 
before Erie itself, and even if it did, it would have had to compete 
with other principles that generally allow the Supreme Court to 
make binding decisions about the scope of federal power, as it had 
in Swift v. Tyson. Any such legal source would not solve the prob-
lem of priority, but only push it to a higher level of abstraction. 
This point cannot be dismissed simply as a jurisprudential di-
gression. The positivist argument in Erie functions as the linchpin 
in the argument that federal general common law was created in 
violation of the limited delegation of powers to the federal govern-
ment. According to Brandeis, the federal courts made federal gen-
eral common law under Swift v. Tyson; they could not find it in "a 
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obli-
gatory within it unless and until changed by statute."33 No such 
30. Justice Story emphasized the status of state decisions only as evidence of general 
common law, but not the law itself. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842); see Alfred Hill, 
The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1032 (1953). 
31. 304 U.S. at 78. 
32. ld. at 77-78. 
33. ld. at 79. 
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body of natural law existed. But if they made the law themselves, 
they acted in excess of the limited powers delegated to the federal 
government under the Constitution. The problem with this argu-
ment is not that it proves too little; it proves too much. It discredits 
the federal general common law of Swift v. Tyson, but also discred-
its along with it any form of judge-made law, including that made in 
Erie itself. 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL POSITIVISM 
One symptom of the problems with the positivist argument in 
Erie is its association with the predictive theory oflaw. In an unfor-
tunate series of decisions, the Supreme Court admonished the lower 
federal courts after Erie that it required them to follow the decisions 
of lower state courts, whether or not those decisions were binding 
on other courts within the state.J4 These decisions, although since 
disapproved, still make their influence felt in cases in which federal 
courts have confined themselves to "predicting" what state law is.Js 
Just as slavishly following state decisions avoids the risk of making 
new law, predicting what the state courts will do minimizes the risk 
that any new law can be blamed upon the federal courts. In cases in 
which the state courts have not spoken, there are no decisions for 
the federal courts to follow. The next best thing is to follow the 
decisions that the state courts are likely to hand down in the future. 
And indeed, such a predictive theory of law has a close affinity with 
legal positivism. It is one of the versions of legal positivism es-
poused by Holmes, the same source from which Brandeis drew the 
legal positivism in Erie. As Holmes said, in a famous aphorism, 
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing 
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."J6 This predictive 
theory of law has been everywhere discredited as a theory of adjudi-
cation-except in its application to state law under the Erie 
doctrine.J7 
This symptom of the influence of legal positivism, by itself, 
would not be cause for alarm. As subsequent decisions have made 
clear, the restraint upon federal judges promised by the predictive 
theory of law operates only intermittently.Js As with many doc-
34. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law in 
Benchmarks at 173 (cited in note 19). 
35. E.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956); Cooper v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945). 
36. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1895). 
37. E.g., Hart, The Concept of Law at 138-44 (cited in note 21). 
38. E.g., Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973) (predicting Florida law), va-
cated sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) (ordering certification of ques-
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trines aimed only at restraining judicial power, it appears to have 
succeeded only when federal judges have been inclined to be re-
strained anyway. Legal positivism casts a far longer shadow over 
the new federal common law that has grown up after Erie, in the 
wake of the dramatic expansion of federal statutory and constitu-
tional law in recent decades. Doubts continue to be raised, notably 
by Justice Scalia39 and Professor Redish,40 about the legitimacy of 
federal common law. And even the defenders of federal common 
law have been anxious to define and limit its scope.4t These doubts 
can be traced back, even if they are not entirely dependent on, the 
shadow that legal positivism casts over any form of common law. 
The new federal common law can be defined as judicial deci-
sions, subject to change by Congress, about how to implement basic 
principles of federal statutory or constitutionallaw.42 Unlike the 
federal general common law abolished by Erie, the new federal 
common law is binding upon the states through the Supremacy 
Clause. It is, by definition, innovative law. At one extreme, it 
verges upon statutory interpretation; and at the other, on controver-
sial questions of constitutional law. The precise limits of the new 
federal common law are not as important as its overall character. 
An issue of routine statutory interpretation falls outside its scope 
because the result is dictated by statute. So, too, are decisions that a 
particular government action is unconstitutional and cannot be au-
thorized by Congress. The defining characteristic of federal com-
mon law as it exists today is that it is based upon federal statutes or 
the Constitution without being plainly determined by them. 
It is just such decisions that legal positivism relegates to 
tion to Florida Supreme Court), on remand Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975) 
(disagreeing with prediction of Florida law). I am grateful to my colleague, Mike Dooley, for 
this example. 
39. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (opposing implication of private rights of action from any federal statute). Such 
doubts, however, have not stopped Justice Scalia from making federal common law himself. 
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-14 (1988) (implying federal defense to 
state tort claim). See Donald L. Doemberg, Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 
1990 Utah L. Rev. 759, 766-70, 782-95. 
40. Martin H. Redish, The Federal Courts in the Political Order: Judicial Jurisdiction 
and American Political Theory 29-46 (Carolina Academic Press, 1991). 
41. E.g., George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and The Role of the Federal Courts 
in Private Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 Pace L. Rev. 229, 244-45, 259-61 
(1992); Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace L. Rev. 327, 331-32 (1992); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 12-32 
(1985) (arguing for restrictions on federal common law). 
42. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263, 
267 (1992); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. 
L. Rev. 883, 890-96 (1986); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 30-34 (1975). 
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sources outside of law. Modem positivists regard this position not 
so much as a criticism of decisions in hard cases as a frank recogni-
tion of the inevitable need for judges to engage in lawmaking.4J It is 
only when this positivist premise is combined with principles of lim-
ited government and limited judicial power that it casts doubt upon 
the new common law created by the federal courts. With these ad-
ded premises, it is easy to conclude that the federal courts lack the 
power to make law in this way because it was never delegated to 
them by the Constitution. The fallacy in this argument, which con-
sistent positivists can easily avoid, is the supposition that the need 
for lawmaking in hard cases always biases the decision in favor of 
state law. For a consistent positivist, the decision to limit federal 
judicial power is just as controversial, and just as dependent upon 
arguments of political theory outside of law, as the decision to make 
federal common law. 
What then do we make of the positivist argument in the Erie 
opinion? It cannot stand alone without falling of its own weight. It 
must therefore be supported by other arguments of constitutional 
structure. In particular, it must be narrowed from an attack on all 
forms of judge-made law to a defense of the binding force of state 
judicial decisions. After Erie, the common law of England is indis-
putably law, but it is no more binding on the federal courts than the 
general common law. To put this point another way, as indeed 
some defenders of the particular result in Swift v. Tyson have put 
it,44 the federal courts could appeal to the general common law if 
state law allowed them to do so. If state law did not, then it could 
be overridden only if, as the Rules of Decision Act says, "the Con-
stitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress other-
wise require or provide. "45 The priority of state common law can 
be derived from the Rules of Decision Act and the Tenth Amend-
ment, but its place in our constitutional scheme can be derived only 
from principles that are nowhere explicitly stated, let alone recon-
ciled, in any authoritative source of law. 
The fundamental question about the new federal common law 
is whether it has a sufficient foundation in the Constitution or in 
federal statutes to override state law.46 I do not mean to minimize 
the difficulty of this question. The point of this comment has been 
that the difficulty of this question should not predispose courts to 
43. See supra note 21. 
44. WiiJiam P. LaPiana, Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipresence in the Sky: An 
Investigation of the Idea of Law in Antebellum America, 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 771, 798-814 
(1986). 
45. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1988). 
46. Kramer, 12 Pace L. Rev. at 288 (cited in note 42). 
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answer it in favor of state law. The legal positivism selectively en-
dorsed by Justice Brandeis had only the federal general common 
law as its target, not the new federal common law that has since 
developed. His opinion applying federal common law to an inter-
state water dispute, handed down the same day as Erie, demon-
strates that he did not share the general positivist distrust of judicial 
lawmaking. 47 Neither should we. The limits of the new federal 
common law must instead be sought in the federal statutes and the 
constitutional provisions that any particular piece of federal com-
mon law serves and from which it draws its force. These are the 
sources of the new federal common law, but as in Erie itself, they 
are genuine sources of law-the origin, not the end, of federal 
judge-made law. 
47. Hinderlider v. La Plata River cl Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
